Amendments
المؤلف:
W.D. Wallis
المصدر:
Mathematics in the Real World
الجزء والصفحة:
193-194
14-2-2016
1839
We now consider an important example of manipulation of sequential pairwise voting. Suppose three voters on City Council have to decide whether to add a new sales tax. Initially
• A prefers the tax
• B prefers the tax
• C prefers no tax
so a tax will be introduced.
However, let’s assume A hates income taxes and will never vote for one. On the other hand, B prefers income tax to sales tax. Suppose C moves an amendment to change the tax to an income tax.
We now have:
Original motion: that a city sales tax of 5% be introduced.
Amendment (moved by C): change “sales tax of 5%” to “income tax of 2%.” (We’ll assume the 2% income tax will provide the same total as the 5% sales tax.)
In the vote on the amendment, both B and C will vote in favor, with A against, so the amendment is carried. So the motion becomes: a city income tax of 2% shall be introduced. In the vote on the new motion, both A and C are against, while B votes in favor; so the motion is lost and there is no tax.
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